Suchergebnisse

What is recognition and why is it so important? This book develops a synoptic conception of the significance of recognition in its many forms for human persons by means of a rational reconstruction and internal critique of classical and contemporary accounts. The book begins with a clarification of several fundamental questions concerning recognition. It then reconstructs the core ideas of Fichte, Hegel, Taylor, Fraser, and Honneth and utilizes the insights and conceptual tools developed across these chapters for developing a case for the universal importance of recognition for humans. It argues in favour of a universalist anthropological position, unusual in the literature on recognition, that aims to construe a philosophically sound basis for a discourse of common humanity, or of a shared human life-form for which moral relations of recognition are essential. This synthetic conception of the importance of recognition provides tools for articulating deep intuitions shared across cultures about what makes human life and forms of human co-existence better or worse, and thus tools for mutual understanding about the deepest shared concerns of humanity, or of what makes us all human persons despite our differences. Recognition and the Human Life-Form will appeal to readers interested in philosophical anthropology, social and political philosophy, critical theory, and the history of philosophy. It also provides ideas and conceptual tools for fields such as anthropology, education, disability studies, international relations, law, politics, religious studies, sociology, and social research.

Recognition in general comes in many flavours, and so do desires and hopes for recognition. The same is true of recognition of agency in particular. In this short text, I will engage in some basic conceptual work that could be useful for thinking about the theme of this special issue. I will, first, distinguish between several forms of agency that matter in international relations (though not only there) and that can be either recognised or remain unrecognised. Second, I will reflect on what exactly it may mean to 'recognise' agency of these various kinds. Finally, I will discuss possible uses of the denial of agency in international relations.

This paper asks why it is the case that people so often fail to give others recognition, or at least adequate recognition. There are several candidates for an explanation. First, it may be that recognition—the giving or receiving of it or both—requires capacities or skills that are not always available. Secondly, it may be that recognition, even though it is (all things considered) good, involves costs, which leads to a reluctance on the part of the participants in the recognition relation. Thirdly and relatedly, even if recognition would be objectively good for the individuals or groups involved, fathoming this, or being able to experience its goodness, especially against experienced costs that it may incur, may nevertheless require intellectual capacities or understanding that individuals do not necessarily possess. The paper explores these different answers against the broadly Hegelian framework of recognition and 'concrete freedom' Ikäheimo has defended elsewhere.

Why is recognition of such an importance for humans? Why should lack of recognition motivate people to fight or work for recognition? In this article, I first discuss shortly Axel Honneth's somewhat psychologizing strategy for answering these questions, and suggest that the psychological harms of lack of recognition pointed out by Honneth are neither sufficient nor necessary for motivation to fight or work for recognition to arise. According to the alternative that I then spell out, recognition and lack of it are so intimately intertwined with some of the most fundamental and intuitively appealing facts about what it is to be a person in a full-fledged sense — arguably in any culture — that there are reasons to be optimistic about a more or less universal existence of latent motivation to fight or work for more or more equal recognition.

Preliminary Material /H. Ikaheimo and A. Laitinen -- 1. Recognition And Social Ontology: An Introduction /Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen -- 2. The Structure Of Desire And Recognition: Self-Consciousness And Self-Constitution /Robert B. Brandom -- 3. On Hegel's Claim That Self-Consciousnessis "Desire Itself" ("Begierde Überhaupt") /Robert B. Pippin -- 4. Intuition, Understanding, And The Human Form Of Life /Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer -- 5. Mutual Recognition: Hegel And Beyond /Ludwig Siep -- 6. Holism And Normative Essentialism In Hegel's Social Ontology /Heikki Ikäheimo -- 7. The Relevance Of Hegel's "Absolute Spirit" To Social Normativity /Paul Redding -- 8. Recognition As The Social Grammar Of Species Being In Marx /Michael Quante -- 9. Mutual Recognition And Some Related Phenomena /Margaret Gilbert -- 10. Social Space And The Ontology Of Recognition /Italo Testa -- 11. Recognition, Acknowledgement, And Acceptance /Arto Laitinen -- 12. Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance, And Recognition /Titus Stahl -- 13. The Problem Of Collective Identity:The Instituting We And The Instituted We /Vincent Descombes -- Index /H. Ikaheimo and A. Laitinen.

Sprachliche Analyse -- Systematische Analyse -- Verwandte Begriffe -- Anerkennung in der deutschen Tradition -- Anerkennung in der englischen Tradition -- Anerkennung in der französischen Tradition -- Anerkennung in Bezug zu philosophischen Theoriefamilien -- Anerkennung in anderen Disziplinen -- Zentrale Fragen und Probleme.

This paper is an introduction to the special issue on Pathologies of Recognition. The first subsection briefly introduces the notion of recognition and trace its development from Fichte and Hegel to Honneth and his critics, and the second subsection turns to the concept of a social pathology. The third section provides a brief look at the individual papers.